rfc:session-use-strict-mode

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rfc:session-use-strict-mode [2016/07/06 21:48] yohgakirfc:session-use-strict-mode [2020/08/01 23:51] (current) – Status is "Declined" carusogabriel
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 ====== PHP RFC: Enable session.use_strict_mode by default ====== ====== PHP RFC: Enable session.use_strict_mode by default ======
-  * Version: 0.9+  * Version: 1.0
   * Date: 2016-07-05   * Date: 2016-07-05
   * Author: Yasuo Ohgaki <yohgaki@ohgaki.net>   * Author: Yasuo Ohgaki <yohgaki@ohgaki.net>
-  * Status: Under Discussion+  * Status: Declined
   * First Published at: http://wiki.php.net/rfc/session-use-strict-mode   * First Published at: http://wiki.php.net/rfc/session-use-strict-mode
  
 ===== Introduction ===== ===== Introduction =====
 Due to HTTP cookie implementation, it is easy to create unchangeable/undeletable cookies via JavaScript injections. Single JavaScript injection vulnerability or cookie storage modification via physical access to the client allows attackers to steal user session forever without session.use_strict_mode=1. Due to HTTP cookie implementation, it is easy to create unchangeable/undeletable cookies via JavaScript injections. Single JavaScript injection vulnerability or cookie storage modification via physical access to the client allows attackers to steal user session forever without session.use_strict_mode=1.
 +
 +NOTE: When multiple cookies are valid for a request, browser sends a highest precedence cookie. Cookie sent by browsers differs browser by browser because there is no cookie precedence standard. Attacker can exploit this browser behavior to set unchangeable cookies by using httponly, secure, domain and path cookie attributes. Security impact differs according to web site setup, used browser and session handling code. 
  
 ===== Proposal ===== ===== Proposal =====
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 However, lost sessions are far better than stolen sessions.  However, lost sessions are far better than stolen sessions. 
  
-When attackers set unchangeable session ID cookie for a user, the user will not be able to get valid session ID. i.e. Cannot login, etc.+When attackers set unchangeable session ID cookie for a user, the user will not be able to get valid session ID. i.e. Cannot login via attacker supplied unchangeable session ID, etc.
  
-3rf party session save handlers must implement session ID validation handler for session.use_strict_mode=1 to work actually. i.e. 3rf party session save handlers must use PS_FUNCS_SID or PS_FUNCS_UPDATE_TIMESTAMP. **PS_FUNCS_UPDATE_TIMESTAMP is strongly recommended.**+3rd party session save handlers must implement session ID validation handler for session.use_strict_mode=1 to work actually. i.e. 3rd party session save handlers must use PS_FUNCS_SID or PS_FUNCS_UPDATE_TIMESTAMP. **PS_FUNCS_UPDATE_TIMESTAMP is strongly recommended.**
  
  
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   * Remove additional session data storage access by extending session save handler API.   * Remove additional session data storage access by extending session save handler API.
  
-===== Proposed Voting Choices =====+===== Vote =====
  
-This project requires 2/3+This project requires 2/3 majority
  
 +<doodle title="Enable session.use_strict_mode by default" auth="Yasuo Ohgaki" voteType="single" closed="true">
 +   * Yes
 +   * No
 +</doodle>
  
 +Vote starts 2016/7/12, ends 2016/07/19 23:59:59 UTC.
  
 ===== Patches and Tests ===== ===== Patches and Tests =====
rfc/session-use-strict-mode.1467841680.txt.gz · Last modified: 2017/09/22 13:28 (external edit)