rfc:csrandombytes

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rfc:csrandombytes [2012/01/08 16:13]
fsb [Why PHP's API's today are inadequate]
rfc:csrandombytes [2021/03/27 14:30] (current)
ilutov Move to inactive
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   * Date: 2012 Jan 8   * Date: 2012 Jan 8
   * Author: Tom Worster <fsb@thefsb.org>   * Author: Tom Worster <fsb@thefsb.org>
-  * Status: Draft+  * Status: Inactive 
 +  * Sandbox: https://github.com/tom--/php-cs_random_bytes
  
 Platform and extension-independent API to the system CSPRNG Platform and extension-independent API to the system CSPRNG
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 This function shuld have a parameter specifying the number of random bytes the caller requests. The return value is a string of the requested byte length, the value being provided by the system CSPRNG. This function shuld have a parameter specifying the number of random bytes the caller requests. The return value is a string of the requested byte length, the value being provided by the system CSPRNG.
  
-The function should neither block nor return a failure status in the case that the systems entropy pool is depleted. However, it should allow the caller to discover if this is the case. Thus it should behave as openssl_random_pseudo_bytes() does, continuing to return bytes from the system CSPRNG even when its entropy sources are low and offering a flag it sets if the caller reads beyond what the CSPRNG considers secure. In other words, it should neither behave like /dev/random on Linux, which blocks when entropy is low, nor like mcrypt_create_iv(), which can return insecure results without the caller’s knowledge.  +The function should neither block nor return a failure status in the case that the systems entropy pool is depleted. However, it should allow the caller to discover if this is the case. Thus it should behave as openssl_random_pseudo_bytes() does, continuing to return bytes from the system CSPRNG even when its entropy sources are low and offering a flag that is set if the caller reads beyond what the CSPRNG considers secure. In other words, it should neither behave like /dev/random on Linux, which blocks when entropy is low, nor like mcrypt_create_iv(), which can return insecure results without the caller’s knowledge.
-owledge.+
  
- 
-==== Rejected Features ==== 
- 
-Automated voting system. 
  
 ===== Changelog ===== ===== Changelog =====
rfc/csrandombytes.1326039189.txt.gz · Last modified: 2017/09/22 13:28 (external edit)