If you need a refresher on RFC1867, there's a section below.
RFC1867 defines the multipart/form-data content type. This content type is used primarily for submitting HTTP forms that contain files. PHP supports the parsing of this content type natively, but only for POST requests. Specifically, if a request has the method POST and the content type multipart/form-data the request body is immediately consumed before starting the PHP script and populated into the $_POST and $_FILES superglobals. This functionality triggers automatically and is not exposed to userland directly.
With the emergence of REST it has become increasingly popular to use other HTTP verbs such as PUT and PATCH where the usage of multipart/form-data is entirely valid but not processed by PHP. This requires manual parsing of the request body of this non-trivial format. Handling large amounts of data in userland may also be suboptimal in terms of performance. The corresponding issue has been upvoted over 350 times. https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=55815
This RFC suggests adding a new function request_parse_body()
to expose the existing functionality to userland so that it may be used for other HTTP verbs.
/** * @param array<string, int>|null $options */ function request_parse_body(?array $options = null): array {} // This is a PUT request var_dump($_POST); // [] var_dump($_FILES); // [] [$_POST, $_FILES] = request_parse_body(); var_dump($_POST); // [...] var_dump($_FILES); // [...]
The function returns an array pair with index 0 in the shape of $_POST and index 1 in the shape of $_FILES. If desired, the return values can overwrite the $_POST and $_FILES superglobals. This makes it simple to reuse existing POST endpoints. The function will obtain its input directly from sapi_module.read_post()
.
The function accepts an array of options to override global INI settings. See the “$options parameter” section for more details.
Like the automatically invoked multipart parsing, request_parse_body()
will fail under various conditions.
post_max_size
.max_multipart_body_parts
.max_input_vars
.max_file_uploads
.name
and filename
attribute.
All of these conditions emit warnings for the automatically invoked multipart parsing. However, with a dedicated function we can benefit from exceptions to make parsing errors unmissable. A new Exception class RequestParseBodyException
is created.
class RequestParseBodyException extends Exception {}
It's worth noting that the request_parse_body()
function is not idempotent (when reading directly from the SAPI), even if the function throws. It is thus not safe to call request_parse_body()
twice. This is explained in more detail in the php://input
section below.
Apart from multipart/form-data which is the primary motivation for this RFC, request_parse_body()
also supports the application/x-www-form-urlencoded format. For application/x-www-form-urlencoded the $_FILES-equivalent array is empty. If the content type is not supported, an InvalidArgumentException
is thrown.
Usually, the requests content is accessible through the php://input
stream. This stream buffers the content of the request so that it may be read multiple times. For POST requests, the entire content is read and buffered before control is handed over to the PHP script. For non-POST verbs the content remains unread until the PHP script does so. As the input stream is read it is buffered on the fly.
The singular exception to this buffering mechanism is multipart/form-data for which the input stream is empty. The reasoning is most likely that multipart requests should not need to read the input stream again, since the parsed result is available in $_POST and $_FILES. Buffering the input for these requests essentially means that all files are written to disk twice, doubling the load on the disk in terms of time and space.
For the same reason, request_parse_body()
does not buffer to php://input
. This also means that request_parse_body()
may not be called twice, as it destructively consumes sapi_module.read_post()
.
A dedicated function presents the opportunity to customize parsing limits based on endpoints rather than globally. For example, your website may have a public and a login-protected multipart form. Increasing post_max_size
, upload_max_filesize
or similar settings globally may increase the risk for DoS attacks. As such, it may be preferable to increase these limits only for specific endpoints.
request_parse_body()
accepts a $options
parameter to set override the following INI values:
#[Route('/api/videos', methods: ['PUT'])] public function index(): Response { [$post, $files] = request_parse_body(options: [ 'post_max_size' => '128M', ]); // ... }
Providing invalid keys or values will throw a ValueError
.
One could argue that since POST automatically triggers the parsing of the application/x-www-form-urlencoded and multipart/form-data requests the same should be done for PUT, PATCH and other verbs. There are two primary reasons not to do that.
The first one is backwards compatibility. At least for multipart, the request body is consumed without buffering. Existing code that manually parses multipart will break as the input stream will be empty.
The second reason is that a separate function provides more flexibility. An endpoint that does not accept multipart can terminate early, instead of parsing the request, potentially storing large files, erroring, and then deleting the buffered files again.
If you'd like to make use of these benefits for POST
, you may disable the enable_post_data_reading
ini-setting and then call request_parse_body()
from your application.
Other than reserving request_parse_body()
and RequestParseBodyException
in the global namespace there are no backwards incompatible changes.
RFC1867 defines the multipart/form-data content type. This content type is used primarily for submitting HTTP forms that contain files. It is similar to application/x-www-form-urlencoded in that it contains a list of key-value pairs for each form input. Each input may contain attributes, as well as the content of the input. Each input is separated by a boundary which is an arbitrary string sequence not used in any of the input content sections. The boundary is specified in the Content-Type header, so that the client knows how to split the sections. For files, the original filename and content type are passed as attributes. Here's a simple example of what this might look like.
POST / HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost:9000 Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------84000087610663814162942123332 -----------------------------84000087610663814162942123332 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="post_field" post content -----------------------------84000087610663814162942123332 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file_field"; filename="original_filename.txt" Content-Type: text/plain file content -----------------------------84000087610663814162942123332--
The resulting $_POST and $_FILES superglobals may look like this:
var_dump($_POST); array(1) { ["post_field"]=> string(9) "post data" } var_dump($_FILES); array(1) { ["file_field"]=> array(6) { ["name"]=> string(21) "original_filename.txt" ["full_path"]=> string(21) "original_filename.txt" ["type"]=> string(10) "text/plain" ["tmp_name"]=> string(%d) "/tmp/sometmpfilename" ["error"]=> int(0) ["size"]=> int(12) } }
echo file_get_contents($_FILES['file_name']['tmp_name']); // file content
RFC1867 requests are automatically parsed when the request has the POST HTTP verb. Each non-file input is populated to the $_POST superglobal. For files, the content is stored in a temporary file and an entry is created in $_FILES to provide its metadata, along with a path to the temporary file. At the end of the request, any uploaded files that were not moved by the application get cleaned up. This prevents attacks that attempt to fill the servers disk space.
This RFC previously contained an $input_stream
parameter, with the assumption that RoadRunner and special SAPIs might make use it. However, on closer inspection at how RoadRunner handles files, this does not seem to be the case. For RoadRunner, the Go server already parsers the multipart request, saves any files to disk, and transfers the file handle directly to the PHP worker. Thus, the PHP worker has no reason to parse the request again. New SAPIs like FrankenPHP can make use of multipart parsing by tweaking the sapi_module.read_post()
function.
Since the multipart/form-data content type is used exclusively for server requests, and a PHP process can only receive one request per execution, the use of $input_streams
seems to be limited to web servers written in PHP, like Workerman/AdapterMan. However, they currently represent requests as strings rather than streams. I'm open to extending this functionality in the future if they can demonstrate that they switch to stream-based request processing.
Voting starts 2023-01-22 and ends 2023-02-05.
As this is a language change, a 2/3 majority is required.