PHP binds many external libraries with the core extensions. Several libraries like libxml2, openssl, etc. require exact int data types with their signatures. Built for 64-bit for several platforms like LLP64 or LP64, the int data type is still 32-bit. This means, the user land input might overflow the ranges foreseen in those external libraries signatures, which can lead to any possible negative impacts from functionality to security.
Other aspects of the mentioned issue are internal PHP functions not requiring 64-bit functionality so behaving same way on 64-bit when having possibly non 64-bit argument types in signatures. Yet another impact might be also comparison of variables with 64- and 32-bit, signed and unsigned types.
It is suggested to implement additional formats for ZPP, that are explicitly require
on affected platforms only. In addition, it is suggested to implement a set of macros for range checks and comparison.
The mentioned implementations won't affect places where no range overflows can happen. The checks functionality will be excluded automatically at the compile time on the platform/build combinations where it does not make sense. For example on the platforms like ILP64 these checks make no sense.
All the extensions linking to the libraries or places using internal functions of the mentioned kind have to be adapted with the new ZPP and possibly macro handling.
#if SIZEOF_INT == SIZEOF_ZEND_LONG # define ZEND_LONG_INT_OVFL(zl) (0) # define ZEND_LONG_INT_UDFL(zl) (0) #else # define ZEND_LONG_INT_OVFL(zlong) ((zlong) > (zend_long)INT_MAX) # define ZEND_LONG_INT_UDFL(zlong) ((zlong) < (zend_long)INT_MIN) #endif #if SIZEOF_INT == SIZEOF_ZEND_LONG # define ZEND_LONG_UINT_OVFL(zl) (0) #else # define ZEND_LONG_UINT_OVFL(zlong) ((zlong) < 0 || (zlong) > (zend_long)UINT_MAX) #endif #define ZEND_SIZE_T_INT_OVFL(size) ((size) > (size_t)INT_MAX) #if SIZEOF_INT == SIZEOF_SIZE_T # define ZEND_SIZE_T_UINT_OVFL(size) (0) #else # define ZEND_SIZE_T_UINT_OVFL(size) ((size) > (size_t)UINT_MAX) #endif
#define ZEND_SIZE_T_GT_ZEND_LONG(size, zlong) ((zlong) < 0 || (size) > (size_t)(zlong)) #define ZEND_SIZE_T_GTE_ZEND_LONG(size, zlong) ((zlong) < 0 || (size) >= (size_t)(zlong)) #define ZEND_SIZE_T_LT_ZEND_LONG(size, zlong) ((zlong) >= 0 && (size) < (size_t)(zlong)) #define ZEND_SIZE_T_LTE_ZEND_LONG(size, zlong) ((zlong) >= 0 && (size) <= (size_t)(zlong))
All the macros should be put into a dedicated header, so any extensions and improvements can follow up in the scope.
Introducing new formats
The behaviour of the options:
With the usual way the behavior of ZPP is meant, that is expected at the concrete place. It could be an Error or another Throwable, or a warning. It might depend on other upcoming RFCs and has to be implemented accordingly.
Here is the real case from the current code base, the irrelevant declarations and code are removed. Consider the signature in the underlaying API http://xmlsoft.org/html/libxml-parser.html#xmlReadMemory
The original piece of code
PHP_FUNCTION(simplexml_load_string) { char *data; size_t data_len; zend_long options = 0; ......................... if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s|C!lsb", &data, &data_len, &ce, &options, &ns, &ns_len, &isprefix) == FAILURE) { return; } docp = xmlReadMemory(data, data_len, NULL, NULL, options); ......................... }
The proposed way to fix it using ZPP. Note that 'q' is used for string input and 'i' is used for options.
PHP_FUNCTION(simplexml_load_string) { char *data; int data_len; int options = 0; ......................... if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "q|C!isb", &data, &data_len, &ce, &options, &ns, &ns_len, &isprefix) == FAILURE) { return; } docp = xmlReadMemory(data, data_len, NULL, NULL, options); ......................... }
The proposed way to fix it using the overflow check macro
PHP_FUNCTION(simplexml_load_string) { char *data; size_t data_len; zend_long options = 0; ......................... if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s|C!lsb", &data, &data_len, &ce, &options, &ns, &ns_len, &isprefix) == FAILURE) { return; } if (ZEND_LONG_INT_OVFL(options)) { RETURN_FALSE; } if (ZEND_SIZE_T_INT_OVFL(data_len)) { RETURN_FALSE; } docp = xmlReadMemory(data, data_len, NULL, NULL, options); ......................... }
Several new warnings or harder error handling might be introduced with the new range checks. However this should only affect the edge cases where the errors are actually happen and are catched. The general behaviour has to comply with the behavior in the core.
7.1
No.
Only positive impact with more precise argument checks.
No. Opcache doesn't link to any of the external libraries to be handled by this RFC.
No.
No.
Make sure there are no open issues when the vote starts!
The current usage when no overflows happen is not affected. Only what is affected are the edge cases explained in the introduction.
Having this minimalistic start as a base, the topic of overflows in the mathematical operations can be entered. This topic is not handled by this RFC.
Also, some good patterns for other cases can be added later by need. Like compare int vs size_t, or compare variables with different sizes.
yes/no.
The implementation of the base functionality is trivial and can be done if the proposed strategy is accepted. Many places in the core extensions related to libxml2, openssl, tidy, etc. are obvious and will be addressed already before merging.
After the project is implemented, this section should contain
Links to external references, discussions or RFCs
Keep this updated with features that were discussed on the mail lists.